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Abstract
A recent evaluation of  the Mexican interinstitutional coordination program Estrategia 
100s100, published by Coneval in 2013, did not find many satisfactory results with 
respect to its target population. However, in Coneval’s evaluation all statistical quanti-
ties of  interest were computed at the group level only, thereby overlooking individual 
within-group heterogeneity. In this paper we estimate the heterogeneity of  these treat-
ment effects as a function of  the level of  investment per capita received through the 
program’s actions. We provide evidence that the program was in fact effective whenever 
it was accompanied by the required investment. 
Key words: program evaluation, average treatment effects, heterogeneity, propensity 
score matching.
JEL Classification: C21.
Resumen
Una evaluación reciente del programa mexicano de coordinación interinstitucional 
Estrategia 100s100, publicada por el Coneval en 2013, no encontró todos los resultados 
esperados en su población objetivo. En dicha evaluación, sin embargo, las estimaciones 
se llevaron a cabo sólo a nivel grupal, omitiendo analizar la posible heterogeneidad intra- 
grupo del impacto del programa. En este artículo analizamos esta heterogeneidad como 
una función de la inversión per cápita erogada. Las pruebas realizadas indican que el 
Manuscript received on March 20th, 2014; accepted on October 23rd, 2015.
a  The authors are respectively PhD student at El Colegio de México (Mexico), and Director of  Pro-
gram Evaluation for the Comisión Nacional de Uso Eficiente de Energía (Conuee, Mexico) [Na-
tional Commission for the Efficient Use of  Energy]. The authors would like to thank Consejo 
Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (Coneval) [National Council for the Evalua-
tion of  Social Development Policy] for letting us use their data. Furthermore, the authors would like 
to specially thank Thania de la Garza, Janet Zamudio and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful 
and constructive comments that greatly contributed to improving the final version of  this paper. 
The usual disclaimer applies.
b  Corresponding author: <chuffman@colmex.mx>.
102        Curtis Huﬀman Espinosa and Brenda Valdez Meneses
programa obtuvo de hecho los resultados esperados cuando se acompañó de la inver-
sión requerida. 
Palabras clave: evaluación de programas, efecto medio del tratamiento, heterogeneidad, 
emparejamiento, probabilidad de participación.
IћѡџќёѢѐѡіќћ
There is a growing body of  work in the literature concerning poverty and in-
equality that recognizes that complex social problems, such as the reduction of  
regional inequalities, have multiple causes and therefore require the design and 
implementation of  integral public policies that involve the participation of  several 
governmental, social and private institutions which need to share information, 
objectives, goals and resources (Grindle, 2010; Ordaz Ocampo, 2012; Brown and 
Tandon, 1992; Lustig, 2001). According to Brown and Kalegoankar (2000) and 
Gray (1989), it is almost impossible to efficiently counteract poverty and regional 
inequalities by improving coverage, efficiency and sustainability of  basic public 
delivery services without encouraging the participation of  multiple actors. 
It is widely recognised that integral public policies that require the coordina-
tion of  several government and private institutions are key elements in both 
poverty and regional inequality reduction strategies. Collaboration, cooperation 
and coordination among different levels of  government, the private sector and 
the civil society are aimed at overcoming obstacles such as scarcity of  govern-
ment resources, different government capacities and priorities, and competing 
demands among the different sectors involved when governments try to address 
regional inequalities and poverty issues. 
However, this interinstitutional coordination among the different actors in-
volved has proven to be more complex in practice than it might seem. Efforts 
made in the past have shown that political will by itself  is not enough for coor-
dination strategies to work. Policy designers have to develop mechanisms and 
rules that suit the interests of  multiple diverse institutions (Grindle, 2010) through 
differentiated social policies according to each local and regional reality. 
For this reason, the Mexican government has been implementing integral 
policies since the seventies in order to address poverty and regional inequali-
ties based on interministerial coordination. For instance, the last administration 
implemented the umbrella program Estrategia 100s100 (E100s100) that sought 
to increase social and economic development in the 125 municipalities with the 
 Heterogeneous treatment eﬀects in development policy evaluation        103
lowest Human Development Index (HDI) by way of  300 different actions carried 
out through the coordination of  several government ministries and institutions. 
Likewise, the current federal administration has just launched the Cruzada Na-
cional Contra el Hambre [National Crusade Against Hunger] that has targeted 
the population that lives in extreme poverty with food deficiencies. 
Despite advances in the role of  social policy in economic development ―the 
creation of  the Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo 
Social (Coneval) [National Council for the Evaluation of  Social Development 
Policy], for instance―, the interinstitutional coordination strategy launched by 
the Mexican government in recent years seems to not have had very satisfactory 
results in the vulnerable population they have targeted. A recent impact evalu-
ation of  E100s100 published by Coneval (2013) only found a positive impact 
in the reduction of  the percentage of  population without health insurance and 
the percentage of  households without concrete flooring. 
These results posed severe doubts concerning both the effectiveness of  the 
E100s100 program and the cooperative efforts of  governments at different 
levels for alleviating poverty and reducing regional inequalities. However, this 
evaluation was based on an Intent to Treat Model (ITM) which means that the 
original assignment of  the municipalities to E100s100 was used to carry out 
the analysis instead of  the effective reception of  the treatment, mainly due to the 
difficulty of  measuring the actual interinstitutional coordination. Hence, as 
Outhwaite and Turner (2008) suggested, under the ITM, finding a non-statisti-
cally significant difference between the treatment and the control group cannot 
be interpreted as if  receiving or not the treatment produces equivalent results. 
It could have been that the treatment spilled out to some of  the control units 
―as argued by Coneval in their evaluation. In Coneval’s evaluation, all statisti-
cal quantities of  interest were computed only at the group level, overlooking 
individual within-group level variations or heterogeneity which, according to the 
data provided by Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (Sedesol) [Ministry of  Social 
Development], exists in terms of  the investment per capita received through 
the program’s specific actions across treated municipalities. It is important to 
mention that the investment data was available only for municipalities that were 
part of  E100s100, so the possibility of  using investment as the treatment vari-
able was not possible.
The hypothesis of  this paper is that E100s100’s intervention is best cap-
tured not only by the treatment status of  the municipalities, but also through 
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the different levels of  investment per capita among the treated municipalities. 
Therefore, the results varied widely, depending upon whether E100s100’s 
intervention included the financial resources dearly needed in the treated mu-
nicipalities, diluting any treatment effect estimated using only the assignment 
to the program as treatment variable. In this paper, we put to empirical test this 
hypothesis assessing the heterogeneity in previously estimated treatment effects 
as a function of  the level of  investment per capita. Unfortunately, whether the 
observed variability in investment per capita speaks of  the degree of  coordina-
tion actually achieved by the officials involved is a whole different matter which 
we cannot assert with the available data. 
There are, however, two reasons why we see the investment per capita as 
part of  E100s100’s intervention, irrespective of  the terms in which this might 
have happened. Firstly, all the investment we have taken into account in our 
analysis ran through the E100s100. That is, we have only used the investment 
for which the coordination effort can be credited. Secondly, even though the 
investment was prominently federal (87%), this does not mean it required no 
involvement of  the E100s100. All federal social programs that worked within 
the framework of  E100s100, and through which the investments were made, 
had as part of  their target population all of  the 125 municipalities on which the 
E100s100 was focused. This left in sight no other obvious culprit for the ob-
served differences in investment per capita but the inner workings of  E100s100, 
especially among paired municipalities. 
A word of  caution is warranted though. Admittedly, exactly how correlated 
is this investment data with an actual measure of  E100s100’s effectiveness is a 
pending task in the literature, and our results should be read accordingly. Ulti-
mately, the readers can make their own conclusions based on the heterogeneity 
analysis presented here. 
This analysis was performed following the practical approach proposed by 
Xie, Brand, and Jann (2012)1 based on observational data using Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM). Hence, the empirical strategy consisted of  firstly, the rep-
lication of  the Propensity Score (PS) estimates carried out in Coneval’s evaluation 
using the same set of  observed pre-treatment covariates for each municipality with 
the same sample consisting of  the 2 456 municipalities throughout the country. 
Secondly, a multiple matching based on the PS estimated was used to transform 
1  See also Brand and Thomas (2013) and Xie (2013). 
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the data into treatment-control comparisons replicating the estimation of  Aver-
age Treatment Effects (ATT). Thirdly, the observed difference in pairs between 
treated municipalities and the group mean of  the multiple matched controls 
(the matched difference for the ATT) was used to estimate the heterogeneous 
treatment effects as a function of  the relevant investment per capita data by 
fitting a linear parametric model to evaluate trends across the municipalities.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 succinctly describes the coordi-
nation efforts implemented by the Mexican government up till the E100s100 
umbrella program was launched. Section 3 reviews the impact evaluation pub-
lished by Coneval. Section 4 describes the data and the methodology employed 
to assess the heterogeneity of  the treatment effects of  E100s100 as a function 
of  the different levels of  investment per capita received through the program’s 
specific actions. Section 5 presents the key results and section 6 discusses and 
concludes these findings.
PџђѣіќѢѠ ѐќќџёіћюѡіќћ ђѓѓќџѡѠ Ѣѝ 
ѡќ ѡѕђ E100s100 ѝџќєџюњ
Since the seventies, the Mexican government has been trying to alleviate com-
plex social problems with the implementation and design of  integral strategies 
based on interinstitutional coordination. In this sense, the idea of  the necessity 
of  integral public policies in Mexico is not new. However, as Ordaz Ocampo 
(2102) argues, the existence of  power asymmetries has led to results that were 
less favourable than expected. 
Probably the first attempt of  this kind of  programs occurred in 1973 with 
the implementation of  the Programa de Inversión de Desarrollo Rural (PIDER) 
[Public Investment Program for Rural Development]. Its main objective was 
the promotion of  integral rural development through the participation of  the 
three levels of  government. However, the integral approach and its transversal 
nature surpassed the public administration’s capacity and ultimately generated 
actions that were not a product of  this desired coordination among different 
government institutions (Herrera, 2007). 
By 1977, the Coordinación General del Plan Nacional de Zonas Deprimi-
das y Grupos Marginados (COPLAMAR) [General Coordination for the National 
Plan of  Depressed Zones and Marginal Groups], was created with the explicit 
objective of  reducing levels of  exclusion of  farmers, migrants and indigenous 
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people, among others. According to Ordaz Ocampo (2012), both PIDER and 
COPLAMAR were undermined by the lack of  public officials skilled in decision-
making and with broad authority to determine the appropriate actions for local 
circumstances. 
In 1994, the Congress declared as Zonas de Atención Prioritaria (ZAP) [Priority 
Attention Areas], the most vulnerable geographic areas on which development 
policies should focus their attention. This was part of  the efforts for improving 
the design of  public policies aimed at enhancing the integral development of  the 
municipalities with the highest levels of  social exclusion and poverty.
In 2000, the new administration launched the Estrategia Microregiones program 
[Micro-regions Strategy]. This program was meant to improve the wellbeing 
of  the most disadvantaged part of  the population who had been excluded from 
the provision of  basic infrastructure and services due to their geographical 
dispersion and isolation, the low capacities of  local governments. This involved 
the participation of  multiple government officials, the private sector and the 
community, but in practice, the support came almost entirely from the highest 
Federal level mainly due to the change of  the political party in power and the 
coexistence of  different ideological views (ITESM, 2007). 
With the same spirit of  tackling regional inequalities and poverty, in 2006 
the Mexican government launched yet another interinstitutional coordination 
program called Estrategia 100s100 (E100s100), having as its main objective the 
increase of  social and economic development in the 125 municipalities with 
the lowest HDI and highest levels of  social exclusion. 
The E100s100 umbrella program had two specific objectives: 1) To increase 
the income of  the population who lived in these most disadvantageous 125 mu-
nicipalities through actions oriented to increase productivity and employment 
opportunities and 2) To increase their quality of  life through improvements 
in both the access and quality to health and education services as well as the 
housing and infrastructure conditions. 
Through over 300 specific interventions carried out by several Government 
Ministries, the program was aimed at improving the wellbeing of  the most vul-
nerable part of  the population focusing on education, health, income, housing, 
infrastructure and environment. These interventions were grouped in what was 
then called “strategic actions” as shown in Table 1.
The E100s100 program was a coordination scheme meant to link and 
complement the different actions carried out by several government branches 
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through approximately 70 different development programs, all of  them aimed at 
confronting regional inequalities and reducing poverty through the coordination 
of  14 Ministries and agencies of  the Federal Government, 7 State Governments 
and 125 Municipality Governments over the 6 different aspects that were meant 
to improve the wellbeing of  the population. Each of  these 6 aspects of  the 
E100s100 had an inter-ministry thematic working group within the Comisión 
Intersecretarial de Desarrollo Social (CIDS) [Interministry Commission for Social 
Development], which was in charge of  establishing the conceptual and opera-
tional basis for the coordination both at the central and state level. The Technical 
Secretary presiding over these thematic working groups was the Secretaría de 
Desarrollo Social (Sedesol) [Minister of  Social Development] with the goal of  
ensuring coordination and communication among them. Coordinating each 
thematic group was the responsibility of  the head of  the respective Ministry 
who was responsible for monitoring all investment plans and defining both the 
specific performance indicators and the targets to be achieved.
Table 1
Aspects and actions of the E100s100 program
Aspect Strategic actions
Education Shelters, literacy, scholarships, schools, educative packages and others
Infrastructure Potable water, rural roads, highways, digital connectivity, urban develop-ment, electrification, bridges and sanitation
Income Development agencies, training, saving and financing, temporal employ-ment, support programs and productive projects
Environment Environmental courses, environmental support projects, environmental projects, recycle, reforestation and ecological reserves
Health Seniors, energetic support, food assistance, hospitals, clinics and mobile units, popular insurance and health services
Housing Stoves, walls, housing packages, cement flooring, extra room, toilet services, ceilings, property titles and basic housing unit
Source: Estrategia 100s100. Available at: <hĴp://www.estrategia100s100.gob.mx>.
In summation, the E100s100 was not a program of  the Federal Government in 
the sense of  having its own budget, but it was a scheme for the coordination of  
joint actions by different federal programs to promote the economic and social 
development. The E100s100 did not “plan” as much as it “manage”.
According to data provided by Sedesol for the period of  2007-2011, approxi-
mately 39 544 million pesos (some 2 950 million usd of  the time) were spent 
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as part of  the actions carried out by E100s100 from which 87% represented 
federal investment, 10% was state investment and only 3% represented munici-
pal investment. From the grand total, the Sedesol contributed with the largest 
investment representing 45.6% of  the total, followed by the Comisión Nacional 
para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas (CDI) [National Commission for the 
Development of  Indigenous Populations] with 17.3%, while the Ministries of  
Education and Health only contributed 3.4% and 2.5% respectively.
PџђѣіќѢѠ іњѝюѐѡ ђѣюљѢюѡіќћ ќѓ E100s100 
In order to identify the effects of  E100s100 regarding one of  its objectives 
―the improvement of  living conditions―, in 2012 Coneval carried out an inten-
tion-to-treat evaluation of  the program by making use of  public information 
of  the 2,456 municipalities in the country, mainly from the Censo de Población y 
Vivienda [Population and Housing Census] from 2000 and 2010 and the Conteo 
de Población y Vivienda [Population and Housing Count] from 2005, drawing on 
this last one for baseline covariates.2
The causal treatment effects of  the E100s100 program ―under the assump-
tion of  treatment homogeneity― were estimated for several performance indi-
cators including components of  the HDI3, the Índice de Desarrollo Social (IRS)4 
[Social Gap Index], and the Índice de Marginación (IM)5 [Marginalization Index]. 
The identification strategy to estimate the treatment effects was selection on 
observable factors, making use of  PSM and Regression Discontinuity Design. 
Additionally, PSM was combined with Differences in Differences in order to 
control for unobservable characteristics that remained constant over time but 
that could have influenced selection into treatment and potential outcomes.6 
Table 2 reproduces the main diagnostics of  the different PSM algorithms 
employed in Coneval’s evaluation.7 
2  See Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía. Available at: <www.inegi.org.mx>.
3  Provided by the PNUD (2000; 2005).
4  Provided by Coneval (2005).
5  Provided by CONAPO (2005).
6  For an introduction to these statistical methods see Gertler et al. (2011) and Bernal and Peña (2011), 
for a more specialized text see Guo and Fraser (2014), and Pan and Bai (2015).
7  For reasons of  space we do not reproduce here the RDD’s results, the details of  which can be found in 
<http://www.coneval.gob.mx/Informes/Evaluacion/Impacto/Evaluacion_de_impacto_de_la_Es-
trategia_100x100.pdf>.
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Several points are worth mention. It is important to notice that in Coneval’s 
evaluation no good matching was possible for the 125 treated municipalities. 
With the best matching algorithm, radius caliper of  0.05 according to Coneval’s 
evaluation, 52 treatment municipalities were discarded, that is, the treatment 
effect for these municipalities could not have been estimated because it was 
not possible to find them a good match, i.e., the closest control municipality for 
each of  them had a propensity score “farther away” than 0.05. Note that even 
though the inverse-probability weighting estimator (IPW) made use of  most 
of  the data, Table 2 shows that the p-values of  the likelihood-ratio test of  
the joint insignificance of  all the regressors, before and after matching, were 
both zero, and that it exhibited the second larger value for the median of  the 
standardized bias.
Table 2
Diagnostic tests before and after matching
Algorithm
Median bias p>chi2 Observationsafter matching
Before 
matching
After 
matching
Before 
matching
After 
matching Treatment Control
Nearest neighbor 
without replacement 156.1 18.15 0 0 74 74
Nearest neighbor 
with replacement 156.1 14.85 0 0.001 74 24
Nearest neighbor 
with replacement 
(5 neighbors)
156.1 12.67 0 0.087 74 53
Kernel (0.05) 156.1 23.42 0 0.263 73 152
Radius caliper 0.025 156.1 20.7 0 0.346 56 91
Radius caliper 0.05 156.1 11.1 0 0.168 73 156
Inverse-probability 
weighting (IPW) 156.1 20.40 0 0 119 1 632
Note: p-values correspond to the likelihood-ratio test of the joint insignificance of all the regressors 
before and after matching.
Source: Coneval (2013) and own calculations.
For completeness, Tables 3 and 4 reproduce, in levels and differences respectively 
and for every PSM algorithm, the estimated effect of  the E100s100 program 
on the outcome variables analyzed in Coneval’s evaluation.
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Table 3
юѡѡ in levels of 2010
Outcome variables (2010) Radius caliper Nearest neighbor Kernel іѝѤ0.025 0.05 Without rep With rep With 5 neighbors
% of illiterate population of 15 years 
or older
2.501 2.040 3.407** 2.181 2.074 2.408 5.645***
(2.253) (1.990) (1.33) (2.203) (1.81) (1.990) (2.121)
Rate of scholar aĴendance 6 to 24 
years old
–1.123 –1.226 –0.241 –1.061 0.146 –1.412 0.0927
(2.237) (1.968) (0.991) (2.352) (1.85) (2.022) (2.773)
Rate of scholar absence 6 to 14 years 
old
1.819 2.036* 0.969 2.165 1.347 2.212* 2.528*
(1.396) (1.152) (0.717) (1.327) (1.061) (1.182) (1.391)
Rate of incomplete elementary school 1.740 2.208 3.126** 2.891 1.402 2.61 2.956(2.015) (1.883) (1.195) (2.069) (1.79) (1.92) (2.318)
% of population without access to 
health services
–26.6*** –22.4** –12.47** –26.65*** –19.39*** –23.74** –23.05**
(8.105) (8.751) (5.242) (9.204) (8.37) (8.749) (10.38)
% of households without cement 
flooring
2.469 2.094 6.009** 3.295 1.94 2.202 –3.060
(4.102) (3.766) (2.292) (4.394) (3.474) (3.805) (5.031)
Average number of persons per room 0.131* 0.115* 0.177*** 0.158* 0.864 0.118* 0.160***(0.0712) (0.0674) (0.0578) (0.081) (0.067) (0.07) (0.0521)
% of households with neither drainage 
nor private toilet
2.048 2.400 1.08 3.035 0.745 3.178 0.124
(4.875) (3.982) (2.524) (4.704) (3.393) (4.11) (5.427)
% of households without tap water –7.732 –8.518 –1.675 –9.432 –3.373 –7.801 –18.34(7.768) (7.527) (4.202) (9.106) (6.563) (7.606) (11.18)
% of households without drainage 
system
3.367 2.700 8.352 3.197 4.934 2.562 –0.485
(8.909) (8.237) (5.243) (8.438) (7.266) (8.326) (8.862)
% of households without electricity 1.955 2.375 –0.123 2.774 2.132 2.466 –2.033(2.942) (2.844) (1.935) (3.258) (2.251) (2.849) (4.790)
% of households without laundry 5.158 3.087 3.969** 4.542 4.318 3.022 12.04(3.618) (3.502) (1.547) (4.281) (2.733) (3.503) (7.901)
% of households without refrigerator 4.923 5.724 8.146*** 8.224* 4.136 5.325 11.51**(4.138) (3.772) (2.791) (4.725) (3.371) (3.71) (5.760)
% of population aged +15 without 
complete elementary school
1.850 2.235 3.152** 2.945 1.388 2.728 3.091
(2.309) (2.141) (1.285) (2.452) (2.045) (2.189) (2.799)
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Poverty –0.355 –0.534 –1.077 –0.353 –0.624 –0.503 –0.110(0.880) (0.879) (0.86) (0.929) (0.795) (0.891) (0.603)
Extreme poverty 2010 –0.578 –0.265 2.909 0.314 –0.847 –0.267 2.228(2.311) (2.385) (1.992) (2.68) (2.246) (2.42) (2.783)
Moderate poverty 2010 0.192 –0.290 –1.832 –0.692 0.198 –0.26 –2.354(1.883) (1.849) (1.399) (2.073) (1.735) (1.861) (2.541)
Vulnerable population by social depri-
vation 2010
0.464 0.665 –0.747 0.455 0.695 0.623 0.269
(0.814) (0.785) (0.77) (0.861) (0.738) (0.801) (0.576)
Vulnerable population by income 2010 –0.0372 –0.0531 –0.0797* –0.0432 –0.0343 –0.05 –0.0954*(0.0621) (0.0749) (0.045) (0.065) (0.049) (0.074) (0.0565)
Not poor neither vulnerable popula-
tion 2010
–0.0781 –0.0818 –0.250** –0.0568 –0.0392 –0.074 –0.0719
(0.126) (0.147) (0.123) (0.121) (0.092) (0.146) (0.107)
Deprived in the access to social secu-
rity 2010
0.257 0.111 0.912 –0.0311 –0.127 0.0064 1.965
(1.002) (1.055) (0.586) (1.082) (0.689) (1.05) (1.803)
Deprived in the quality and spaces 
of housing 2010
7.168 7.285 11.07*** 9.053 6.632 7.449 –1.166
(5.029) (4.654) (2.784) (5.513) (4.257) (4.754) (7.427)
Deprived in the access to social basic 
housing services
2.497 2.015 2.691 3.81 3.271 2.401 2.263
(2.895) (2.669) (2.161) (3.247) (2.68) (2.742) (3.300)
Deprived in the access to food 0.217 –1.323 1.2 –0.238 –2.459 –0.942 1.635(3.228) (2.822) (2.318) (3.148) (2.728) (2.882) (2.747)
Population with at least one social 
deprivation
0.116 0.133 0.335** 0.0986 0.0735 0.122 0.162
(0.178) (0.217) (0.159) (0.176) (0.129) (0.215) (0.150)
Population with three or more social 
deprivations
–1.849 –1.430 1.077 –1.534 –2.025 –1.543 1.872
(3.099) (3.301) (1.914) (3.458) (2.623) (3.309) (4.828)
Population with income below the 
welfare line
–0.397 –0.586 0.984 –0.4 –0.66 –0.552 –0.202
(0.860) (0.846) (0.835) (0.907) (0.778) (0.859) (0.603)
Population with income below the 
minimum welfare line
0.430 0.295 3.269** 0.847 0.932 0.339 1.415
(1.765) (1.764) (1.554) (1.99) (1.617) (1.806) (1.552)
Observations
Treatment 56 73 74 74 74 73 119
Control 91 156 74 24 53 152 1 632
Source: Coneval (2013) and own calculations.
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Table 4
юѡѡ in Diﬀerences in Diﬀerences
Outcome variables
Radius caliper Nearest neighbor
Kernel іѝѤ
RC 0.25 RC 0.05 Without rep With rep With 5 neigbors
% of illiterate population of 15 years 
or older
2.362 2.561 0.797 2.397 2.607 2.701 0.983
(2.18) (1.9) (1.519) (1.906) (1.958) (1.879) (2.075)
Rate of scholar aĴendance 6 to 24 
years old 
0.908 –0.116 0.47 0.157 –0.627 0.169 3.899
(2.3) (2.6) (1.264) (2.572) (2.134) (2.558) (5.143)
Rate of scholar absence 6 to 14 years 
old
–0.386 –0.24 –0.284 –0.655 –0.387 –0.417 –0.00691
(1.59) (1.39) (1.245) (1.622) (1.524) (1.423) (1.118)
% of population without access to 
health services
–30.37** –30.37** –14.14 –32.75** –33.12** –30.64** –19.62**
(13.32) (12.85) (10.21) (14.87) (12.67) (12.78) (9.613)
% of households without cement 
flooring
–12.8 –14.56* –14.85** –12.69 –16.50** –13.64 –14.49**
(8.79) (8.8) (6.152) (9.219) (8.155) (8.86) (6.933)
Average number of persons per room 0.161 0.224 0.224 0.161 0.272 0.178 0.254(0.27) (0.221) (0.15) (0.268) (0.203) (0.234) (0.234)
% of households with neither drain-
age nor private toilet
7.368 4.73 0.241 6.296 3.203 5.694 5.339
(5.45) (4.12) (3.199) (5.956) (5.233) (4.311) (4.534)
% of households without tap water –0.561 –4.64 –5.575 –0.296 –4.668 –3.625 1.263(8.63) (7.72) (6.123) (7.689) (7.077) (7.745) (7.524)
% of households without drainage 
system
2.52 3.17 –1.285 5.522 4.433 3.211 5.169
(8.95) (7.65) (6.096) (8.881) (7.333) (7.76) (5.530)
% of households without electricity –2.61 –1.46 1.112 –2.407 –0.337 –1.682 –3.048(4.24) (3.72) (2.907) (3.981) (3.141) (3.759) (3.230)
% of households without laundry –2.378 –2.00 –0.214 –1.752 –0.675 –2.164 –4.426(2.017) (1.79) (1.021) (2.115) (1.375) (1.815) (3.413)
% of households without refrigerator –4.17 –3.98 –2.904 –3.1 –2.295 –4.081 –7.730(3.4) (2.97) (1.878) (2.925) (2.523) (2.984) (5.706)
Note: The diﬀerences taken correspond to the years 2010-2005-(2005-2000). Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Source: Coneval (2013) and own calculations.
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From the 29 outcome variables analyzed in this evaluation, according to the 
matching algorithm favored by Coneval, statistically significant results were found 
only in the reduction of  the percentage of  population without access to health 
services and in the reduction of  the percentage of  households without cement 
flooring. However, this last result was not robust for all the different samples 
and specifications employed. The improvement in conditions regarding the 
lack of  access to health services was 30.4%. A figure that represents a reduc-
tion in the performance indicator of  47.3% with respect to the control group 
(Coneval, 2013). 
However, it is important to recall that this evaluation was based on the ITM so 
if  the results did not show significant differences between the treatment and 
the control municipalities in the relevant outcome variables over which the im-
pact was measured, this should not be interpreted as if  the E100s100 program 
did not have the desired impact on their beneficiaries. As mentioned before, 
under the ITM, it was not possible to determine whether some of  the treated 
municipalities ended up being untreated or if  some of  the control municipali-
ties actually received the treatment due to spillover effects. In other words, all 
we know is that municipalities in the sample ended up being treated alike ―i.e. 
missing or receiving the treatment― and therefore responding alike (Outhwaite 
and Turner 2008) on the average. 
Accordingly, the conclusions of  the evaluation performed by Coneval state 
that it could have been the case that the actions of  the different federal social 
programs coordinated by the E100s100 umbrella program did not focus only 
on the 125 most vulnerable municipalities, but covered all municipalities with 
high IRS, the control group among them. In summary, there was no evidence 
to state that there was a singular prioritization of  these 125 municipalities in 
contrast with other poor municipalities of  the country. It merits attention the 
fact that the only outcomes in which the evaluation found the expected results 
were associated to two highly centralized subprograms: Seguro Popular [Popular 
Insurance] and Piso Firme [Concrete Flooring], presumably two subprograms 
that didn’t require much coordination.
In Coneval’s evaluation, all statistical quantities of  interest were computed 
only at the group level ―under the assumption of  treatment homogeneity―, 
overlooking within-group heterogeneity which existed in terms of  the invest-
ment per capita received through the program’s specific actions across different 
municipalities. Heterogeneous treatment effects are seldom studied empirically 
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in the evaluation of  development programs, regardless of  their important impli-
cations for social policy. On the one hand, if  policy makers understand pat-
terns of  treatment effect heterogeneity, they can more effectively concentrate 
their efforts where they are more sorely needed. On the other hand, the study 
of  treatment effect heterogeneity can also yield important insights about how 
scarce social resources are distributed in an unequal society (Xie, Brand, and 
Jann, 2012; Manski, 2007).
In this paper we followed Xie, Brand, and Jann (2012) in their approach 
to studying treatment effect heterogeneity that builds on the same framework 
for estimating the causal effects. That is, under the ignorability or selection on 
observables assumption. The ignorability assumption allows the researcher to 
explore empirical patterns of  treatment effect heterogeneity as a function of  
other variables such as the propensity score itself  and in our case of  investment 
per capita disaggregated by specific action of  the program, which in turn it was 
taken as differences in the actual treatment received by the municipalities. This 
strategy was followed in view of  the lack of  any additional information regard-
ing the actual coordination achieved by program. 
Dюѡю
For the replication of  the results estimated in Coneval’s evaluation, we used the 
same data on socioeconomic conditions, social gaps, levels of  marginalization and 
poverty from the 2 456 municipalities of  the country contained in the Censo de 
Población y Vivienda of  2000 and 2010, the Conteo de Población y Vivienda of  2005, 
the municipal HDI, the IRS and the IM.
The 125 treated municipalities of  the E100s100 program comprised the 100 
municipalities with the lowest HDI in the year of  2000 and the 25 municipalities, 
identified by Coneval, both with a high level of  social exclusion and more than 
60 per cent of  their population living under food poverty. Whereas the pool of  
control municipalities consisted of  the rest of  the municipalities of  the country. 
That is, 2 331 municipalities comprised the pool from which the comparison 
group were matched. 
Additionally, for the estimation of  the heterogeneity in treatment effects, 
this paper used information provided by the Sedesol regarding the level of  in-
vestment by Strategic Actions for each of  the 125 treated municipalities from 
2007 to 2011. It is important to recall that this investment data was not avail-
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able for the 2 331 non-treated municipalities of  the sample. Note also that the 
investment data we used in our estimates was produced as a byproduct of  the 
E100s100 and no similar data exists for any other municipality apart from 
the 125 that comprised its target population. By no means this is to say that 
none of  the other municipalities excluded from the E100s100 received any 
investment, or that they were not part of  the target population of  other, or even 
the same, social programs. The social programs themselves did not constitute the 
E100s100 for it was a coordination scheme. 
 This is why it was impossible to use the investment variable as the treat-
ment. Instead, the investment per capita by Strategic Action in each of  the 125 
treated municipalities was taken as differences in the intervention that actually 
took place.
According to the yearly investment data provided by Sedesol, the global 
investment per capita by Aspect at the municipal level has been unequal among 
treated municipalities for the period 2007-2011. For instance, the municipality 
of  Mezquital in the northern State of  Durango received 8.7 more resources per 
capita than San Simón Zahuatlán in the south state of  Oaxaca for the period of  
2007-2011. On average the former municipality received 3.1 more resources 
than the rest of  the municipalities that were part of  E100s100. In this paper 
we exploited this variability to get a feeling of  the effect that different ver-
sions of  E100s100’s intervention had on the outcome variables employed in 
Coneval’s analysis.
Regarding the quality of  the investment data, it is important to keep in mind 
that we used it as it was provided by Sedesol: with minimum disaggregation of  
the specific institution financially responsible for the spending or the specific 
kind of  service delivered. These were aggregate figures and should not be 
interpreted as an exhaustive account of  the money spent in the municipalities 
that comprised the E100s100 target population in that period. However, it 
was not our intention to use the investment data to estimate the true cost of  
observing a desired effect on the most vulnerable territories in the country. 
Rather, in this paper we used the variability in the data as an indicator of  the 
particular intervention that took place in each of  the 125 municipalities. As long 
as whatever quality issues in the data apply to all municipalities, and we had no 
reason to believe this was not the case, we were on safe ground assuming the 
data fit our purposes. 
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HќњќєђћђќѢѠ ѡџђюѡњђћѡ ђѓѓђѐѡѠ ђѠѡіњюѡђѠ, ю џђѝљіѐюѡіќћ
ќѓ ѡѕђ ѝџќѝђћѠіѡѦ Ѡѐќџђ юћё њюѡѐѕіћє ђѠѡіњюѡђѠ
As mentioned before, as a first step to estimate the heterogeneity in treatment 
effects, we had replicated the matching procedure championed in Coneval’s 
evaluation: radius matching with a maximum distance of  0.05 for controls. Table 
5 shows mean-comparison tests of  several variables as balance diagnostics for 
comparing the distribution of  baseline covariates between treatment groups. 
Table 5
Mean-comparison tests between treatment groups 
(Radius caliper 0.05) 
Variable
Unmatched Mean
% bias
% reduct t-test
Matched Treated Control bias t p > t
ѕёі 2005
U 0.62 0.76 –280.60 –26.18 0.00
M 0.63 0.64 –21.10 92.50 –2.06 0.04
% of population under food 
poverty
U 68.45 31.00 277.50 23.45 0.00
M 66.28 67.30 –7.60 97.30 –0.75 0.46
% of population under asset 
poverty
U 89.47 61.61 216.70 17.21 0.00
M 88.54 89.46 –7.20 96.70 –1.14 0.26
Infant mortality rate 2005
U 36.87 22.39 200.80 20.48 0.00
M 35.42 33.60 25.20 87.40 1.79 0.08
Female infant mortality rate 
2005
U 32.65 19.83 200.80 20.48 0.00
M 31.36 29.75 25.20 87.40 1.79 0.08
Scholar aĴendance rate 
2005( 6-24 years)
U 61.77 64.61 –47.80 –5.38 0.00
M 63.11 63.77 –11.10 76.70 –0.69 0.49
Scholar female aĴendance 
rate 2005 (6-24 years )
U 1 228.60 3 752.90 –34.40 –2.68 0.01
M 1 277.60 1 064.40 2.90 91.60 0.97 0.33
% of illiterate population of 
15 years or more
U 41.98 15.37 271.60 30.27 0.00
M 38.50 37.06 14.80 94.60 1.14 0.26
Average education level
U 3.59 6.18 –224.00 –19.17 0.00
M 3.84 3.94 –8.80 96.10 –0.95 0.34
% of population over 5 
years that speak indigenous 
language
U 7 443.70 2 159.80 69.70 9.14 0.00
M 7 420.00 5 728.10 22.30 68.00 1.17 0.24
% of people living in houses 
with neither drainage sys-
tem nor private toilet
U 18.71 9.85 47.80 7.56 0.00
M 16.53 14.58 10.60 77.90 0.64 0.53
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% of people living in houses 
without electricity
U 22.37 6.97 127.80 21.91 0.00
M 19.85 14.44 44.90 64.80 2.50 0.01
% of people living in houses 
without tap water
U 52.54 19.22 149.10 18.12 0.00
M 49.27 57.33 –36.10 75.80 –1.95 0.05
Logarithm of total popula-
tion
U 8.82 9.35 –40.60 –3.69 0.00
M 8.78 8.64 11.00 73.00 0.82 0.42
Logarithm of the total fema-
le population
U 8.16 8.68 –40.50 –3.68 0.00
M 8.12 7.97 11.40 72.00 0.85 0.40
% of population from 0 to 4 
years old
U 13.58 10.11 170.00 20.60 0.00
M 12.99 13.39 –19.50 88.50 –1.19 0.24
% of population from 0 to 
14 years old
U 42.51 33.13 206.70 20.68 0.00
M 41.62 41.99 –8.00 96.10 –0.55 0.58
% of population of 60 years 
old or more
U 7.87 11.15 –82.90 –7.58 0.00
M 8.59 8.20 10.10 87.90 0.80 0.43
Source: Own elaboration.
It’s important to note that all variables exhibited major reductions in the stan-
dardized bias. Also in none of  them was possible to reject the hypothesis of  
the equality of  the means between treated and control after matching with a 
p-value smaller than 0.01, and only in two cases with p-value smaller than 0.05. 
Moreover, there was added value in using exactly the same matching as the 
one in Coneval’s evaluation, for it allowed us to reexamine Coneval’s conclu-
sions in its own terms, providing evidence of  heterogeneous treatment effects 
of  the E100s100 program, something that remained a conjecture in the original 
evaluation. 
Remember that these matching results were based on the ITM which means 
that the original assignment of  the municipalities to E100s100 was used to 
carry out the analysis instead of  the effective reception of  the treatment, that 
in this case would’ve correspond to the actual degree of  coordination achieved 
by the different institutions part of  the E100s100.
Also of  importance is the fact that the treated municipalities that were un-
matched using the radius matching algorithm of  0.05 are the ones which have 
the worst conditions among all the treated ones. This explains why it was not 
Table 5, continuation…
Variable
Unmatched Mean
% bias
% reduct t-test
Matched Treated Control bias t p > t
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possible to find a good match for them since they were the most disadvantaged 
municipalities among the rest that were part of  the E100s100 program. Hence, 
let’s keep in mind that what follows, as Coneval’s conclusions, is based only on 
the 73 treated municipalities for which a good match was found. 
At this point we used the level of  investment per capita received through 
the program´s specific actions as a sign of  the mixed nature of  E100s100’s 
intervention to uncover any underlying systematic heterogeneity in the effects 
of  the E100s100 program.
As the annual investment data show, municipalities in the E100s100 pro-
gram differed greatly in the particular “treatment” they received as the amount 
of  investment per capita varies across municipalities. Provided the amount of  
investment per capita reflects differences in the intervention orchestrated by 
E100s100, it was to be expected that municipalities whose treatment included 
the required financial resources would observe the expected effects. 
HђѡђџќєђћђќѢѠ ѡџђюѡњђћѡ ђѓѓђѐѡѠ ђѠѡіњюѡђѠ 
The hypothesis of  our paper is that, provided the different levels of  invest-
ment per capita by specific action among the 125 treated municipalities reflects 
actual differences in E100s100’s intervention, municipalities differ not only in 
their treatment status but also in the particular treatment they received. Thus, 
a systematic heterogeneity in the treatment effects estimated by Coneval was 
expected to be shaped depending on whether the intervention was accompanied 
by the resources dearly needed in the treated municipalities. 
In order to estimate the heterogeneous treatment effects as a function of  
the investment per capita, for every outcome variable, the observed difference 
in a pair between a treated municipality and the group mean of  the multiple 
matched controls municipalities was estimated. That is, following Xie, Brand, 
and Jann (2012), the data was transformed so that the differences in pairs be-
tween matched treated and control municipalities constituted the “observed” 
data subject to further modeling. In other words, the “raw” data for the next 
step were observational differences of  matched comparisons for each outcome 
variable in this third step. 
These differences were used to run a parametric model (Ordinary Least 
Squares) to assess the statistical significance of  a linear trend of  the treatment 
effect heterogeneity as a function of  the associated actions’ investment per 
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capita level.8 Of  course, more flexible modeling devices could be used to fit the 
data such as locally weighted regression. We also followed this approach, which 
we don’t show here for reasons of  space, and the results suggest the linear trend 
as a good approximation. 
Models with a significant linear trend were analyzed to answer whether or not, 
when E100s100’s intervention included a minimum of  financial resources, the 
impact estimated for those particular municipalities were the desired ones. 
Whenever a statistical significance linear trend was found in the analysis of  
every action associated to the outcome variable subject of  study, the differ-
ences between the treated municipalities and the group mean of  the multiple 
matched controls were plotted along the level of  investment per capita ―in 
the x-axis. This allowed us to analyze the relation between the observed differ-
ences of  matched comparisons ―for each of  the 29 outcome variables― and 
the investment per capita by specific action in the treated municipalities (the 
heterogeneous treatment effects). 
Additionally as Xie, Brand, and Jann (2012) suggest, the treatment effects 
may vary systematically by the propensity score for treatment due to heteroge-
neity population composition. Hence, the observed matched differences were 
also plotted against the propensity score in order to study the heterogeneity in 
treatment effects as a function of  the probability of  receiving treatment. The 
propensity score itself  was an index of  social exclusion in this case. This was 
done in order to find evidence on which treated municipalities benefited more 
from E100s100 and therefore provided evidence that could be used by policy 
makers in order to assign resources more effectively.
RђѠѢљѡѠ
For reasons of  space, and to avoid flooding the reader with numbers, this sec-
tion presents only part of  the results of  the regression analysis of  the matched 
differences against investment per capita disaggregated by specific actions. Only 
those actions that were expected to have a direct impact on the outcome vari-
able in question were reported in this section. We’ve also omitted the results 
8  Another possibility is to estimate the statistical significance of  an interaction term in a weighted 
regression of  the outcome variable on the treatment indicator and the investment per capita using as 
weights the frequency with which the observation is used as a match. However, here we follow Xie 
and colleagues’ approach. 
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for the outcome variables for which no statistically significant ―robust errors 
were taken into account whenever they were bigger than the usual errors― re-
lations were found.9 
Table 6 shows the main results of  the analysis of  treatment heterogeneity for 
the percentage of  illiterate population of  15 years and older in the municipality. 
Table 6
Heterogeneity analysis for illiteracy
 Matched diﬀerences юѡѡ for illiteracy
 Levels 10 First diﬀerences
Double 
diﬀerences
Triple 
diﬀerences
Shelters –0.00149* –0.00140** –0.00236 –0.00201**
(–0.0007) (0.000629) (0.00144) (0.000963)
Observations 69 53 48 48
R-squared 0.022 0.088 0.055 0.086
Propensity Score 8.553** 0.568 7.586** –0.186
(3.259) (1.553) (3.692) (2.654)
Observations 73 73 65 65
R-squared 0.088 0.002 0.063 0.000
Note: The ќљѠ regressions were run with robust standard errors and standard errors being the larger 
errors the ones who are reported in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. First diﬀerence: il-
literacy 2010- illiteracy 2005; Double diﬀerences: illiteracy 2010-(illiteracy 2005-illiteracy 2000); Triple 
diﬀerences: illiteracy 2010-illiteracy 2005-(illiteracy 2005-2000). 
Source: Own elaboration.
From these results it can be seen that the coefficient of  investment per capita 
for the action of  Shelters10 is statistically significant and negative for three of  
the estimated differences: the simple difference taken in 2010 on the matched 
municipalities; first differences, that is the difference in difference 2010-2005 
and the difference in difference that discounts the difference in the observed 
trend 2005-2000. All of  this suggests that there was a positive impact on the 
reduction of  the expected illiteracy as the level of  investment per capita for 
Shelters actions increased. 
9  The bulk of  the results are available from the authors on request.
10  This strategic includes specific actions such as educative packages delivered to Shelters; infrastructure 
actions in the Shelters; Scholars in Shelters and actions performed in assistance of  the indigenous 
population.
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This is illustrated in Figure 1 where the difference between a treated munici-
pality and the group mean of  the multiple matched controls is plotted against 
the investment per capita in Shelters. The figure also depicts the lowess or fully 
nonparametric estimation for the same variables and it seems that for this spe-
cific case linearity is a reasonable functional form.
Figure 1
Heterogeneity analysis for Illiteracy: Shelters
10
5
0
5
10
M
at
ch
ed
 d
iﬀ
er
en
ce
s 
TT
 fo
r I
lli
te
ra
cy
0 1 000 2 000 3 000 4 000
Investment per capita if Action: Shelters
95% CI Linear trend Lowess
Source: Own elaboration.
These results, we argue, were informative enough to assert that in those treated 
municipalities where the intervention was accompanied by investment in Shelters, 
the impact on the reduction of  illiteracy was larger than in those municipalities 
in which the intervention didn’t secure a minimum of  financial resources. It is in 
this heterogeneity that the estimated impact in Coneval’s evaluation got lost. 
Table 6 also presents the results of  the analysis where the heterogeneous 
treatment effects of  the program were estimated as a function of  the PS to treat-
ment. The coefficient of  the PS was statistically significant and positive for the 
simple difference in levels and the double difference 2010-(2005-2000). 
Thus, as it can be seen in figure 2, the expected impact of  E100s100 on 
the reduction of  illiteracy was largest for the municipalities that had a lower PS 
―and therefore less likely to be assigned into the program― and attenuates as 
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poorer municipalities ―the ones with greater propensity scores and therefore 
more vulnerable― were considered.
Figure 2
Heterogeneity analysis for Illiteracy: ѝѠ
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Source: Own elaboration.
This implies that the municipalities that have a greater PS ―the ones who are 
most likely to be part of  the program― are the ones who are benefiting less 
from it. Together, these results provided compelling quantitative evidence that 
the E100s100 program has proven most helpful in less vulnerable territories, 
leaving behind those in greater need.
Table 7 shows the results for the Rate of  Scholar Attendance from 6 to 24 
years old. The results indicated a statistically significant trend on the improve-
ment of  the rate of  scholar attendance as the level of  investment per capita 
increased for the strategic actions Educative Packages and Rural Roads for the 
simple difference in 2010, other actions in Education11 for the difference in 
difference, and Cement Flooring12 for the simple difference, double and triple 
11  This includes actions such as Assistance for indigenous education; equipped libraries; Elementary 
school services among many others
12  This consists on the provision of  cement floors in the households that do not have it.
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difference. Again, this table shows that the improvement in the rate of  scholar 
attendance was greater for those municipalities with greater investment. In 
other words, what these figures show is that there was a progressively increas-
ing positive effect on the rate of  scholar attendance as the level of  investment 
per capita in the actions mentioned above increased. 
Table 7
Matched diﬀerences юѡѡ for scholar aĴendance
Actions Levels 2010 First diﬀerences Double diﬀerences Triple diﬀerences
Educative Packages 0.369*** –0.107 0.203 –0.156
(0.130) (0.0912) (0.181) (0.173)
Observations 73 56 51 51
R-squared 0.141 0.025 0.025 0.016
Others Education 0.00226 0.00996* –0.00999 –0.00362
(0.00653) (0.00556) (0.0101) (0.00968)
Observations 73 56 51 51
R-squared 0.001 0.056 0.020 0.003
Rural Roads 0.0003** –0.000219 0.000134 –0.000185
(0.0001) (0.000146) (0.000284) (0.000276)
Observations 68 52 47 47
R-squared 0.035 0.043 0.005 0.010
Cement Flooring 0.0031* 0.00151 0.00493** 0.00464*
(0.00150) (0.00105) (0.00242) (0.00232)
Observations 70 54 49 49
R-squared 0.080 0.038 0.081 0.079
Propensity Score –5.179** –2.900* –0.906 0.917
(2.029) (1.614) (2.735) (2.788)
Observations 73 73 65 65
R-squared 0.049 0.044 0.002 0.002
Note: The ќљѠ regressions were run with robust standard errors and standard errors being the larger 
errors the ones who are reported in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. First diﬀerence: (2010- 
2005); Double diﬀerences: 2010-(2005-2000); Triple diﬀerences: (2010- 2005)-(2005-2000). 
Source: Own elaboration. 
The results for the heterogeneous treatment effects of  the program as a func-
tion of  the PS to treatment suggested that the improvement in the rate of  scholar 
attendance was larger for those municipalities who were less likely to be part 
of  it. 
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Table 3 presents the results for the Rate of  Scholar Absence from 6 to 14 
years old. The results were statistically significant and negative for the invest-
ment per capita in Educative Packages for the simple difference in 2010 and 
Cement Flooring for the simple difference of  2010, double and triple differ-
ences. This indicated that as the level of  investment per capita in each of  these 
actions increased, the estimated impact on the reduction on the rate of  scholar 
absence increased as well. Thus, the expected effect of  E100s100 on the Rate 
of  Scholar Absence was larger for those municipalities on which the interven-
tion included financial resources to the municipalities through these specific 
actions. It is worth mentioning that the specific action Cement Flooring of  
the Housing Aspect was believed to have an impact on the reduction of  the 
scholar absence as it provided households with better hygienic conditions and 
therefore reduced the probability of  getting sick and skip school.
Table 8
Matched diﬀerences юѡѡ 
for Rate of Scholar Absence 6 to 14 years old
Actions Levels 2010 First diﬀerences Double diﬀerences Triple diﬀerences
Educative Packages –0.190** 0.0526 –0.133 0.105
(0.0796) (0.0534) (0.142) (0.105)
Observations 73 56 51 51
R-squared 0.074 0.018 0.018 0.020
Cement Flooring –0.00120 –0.000839 –0.00405** –0.00254*
(0.000893) (0.000674) (0.00190) (0.00142)
Observations 70 54 49 49
R-squared 0.022 0.029 0.088 0.064
Propensity Score 6.591*** –0.570 3.266 –2.865
(1.799) (1.035) (2.577) (2.114)
Observations 73 73 65 65
R-squared 0.159 0.004 0.025 0.028
Note: The ќљѠ regressions were run with robust standard errors and standard errors being the larger 
errors the ones who are reported in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. First diﬀerence: (2010- 
2005); Double diﬀerences: 2010-(2005-2000); Triple diﬀerences: (2010- 2005)-(2005-2000). 
Source: Own elaboration. 
The results of  the heterogeneity in the treatment effects of  E100s100 as a 
function of  the PS show that the coefficient of  the PS was statistically significant 
and inversely correlated to the estimated effect on the Rate of  Scholar Absence. 
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Again, this relationship showed once more a progressively increasing effect, 
this time on the reduction of  the rate of  scholar absence, as municipalities with 
lower PS were included.
Table 9 illustrates the results for the percentage of  households without 
washing machines. These results indicated that there was a progressively greater 
effect as the investment per capita in actions of  Training, Savings and Financ-
ing ―in simple and double differences― and Support Programs for Economic 
Activities ―in simple, first and double differences― increased.
Table 9
Matched diﬀerences юѡѡ for percentage 
of households with no laundry
Actions Levels 2010 First diﬀerences Double diﬀerences Triple diﬀerences
Training, Saving 
and Financing 
–0.012*** –0.00539 –0.0099** –0.000664
(0.00390) (0.00345) (0.00457) (0.00349)
Observations 73 56 51 51
R-squared 0.126 0.043 0.088 0.001
Support Programs –0.00293*** –0.00207** –0.003*** –0.000729
(0.00105) (0.000823) (0.00110) (0.000877)
Observations 73 56 51 51
R-squared 0.106 0.105 0.181 0.014
Note: The ќљѠ regressions were run with robust standard errors and standard errors being the larger 
errors the ones who are reported in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. First diﬀerence: (2010- 
2005); Double diﬀerences: 2010-(2005-2000); Triple diﬀerences: (2010- 2005)-(2005-2000). 
Source: Own elaboration.
Similar results were also found for the percentage of  households without refrigera-
tors for the first, double and triple differences in the case of  Support Programs 
and for the double differences for Training, Savings and Financing.
The last tables show the estimated results on Coneval’s Multidimensional 
Measurement of  Poverty, variables only available for the year 2010, this being 
the reason why no estimations are presented under the difference in difference 
approach. 
Table 10 shows the results for the percentage of  people in poverty due to 
quality and spaces of  the dwelling. This table shows statistically significant and 
negative coefficients for the investment per capita in the actions of  Stoves13 
13  Which entail activities such as the installation and use of  stoves.
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Temporal Employment and Basic Unit Housing. That is, a progressively in-
creasing impact was observed as the investment per capita in these actions 
increased. Again what these figures show is that municipalities with greater lev-
els of  investment per capita in these actions experienced a larger reduction in 
the percentage of  people in poverty due to quality and spaces of  the dwelling 
outcome indicator. 
Table 10
Matched diﬀerences юѡѡ for deprived 
in the quality and spaces of housing
Actions Levels 2010 Actions Levels 2010
Temporal Employment –0.0198* Stoves –0.0339***
(0.0115) (0.0117)
Observations 60 Observations 72
R-squared 0.025 R-squared 0.070
Propensity Score –17.78*** Basic Unit Housing –0.00359**
(6.229) (0.00162)
Observations 73 Observations 45
R-squared 0.103 R-squared 0.049
Note: The ќљѠ regressions were run with robust standard errors and standard errors being the 
larger errors the ones who are reported in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Source: Own elaboration.
The coefficient estimated for the trend in the PS was statistically significant 
indicating that the municipalities that were more likely to participate in the 
program were the ones which had the largest improvement in this indicator. 
A result that contrasted with that of  the educational aspect of  the program, 
suggesting the different contexts in which these actions seem to work for the 
benefit of  the targeted population. 
Table 11 presents the results for the percentage of  the population not mul-
tidimensional poor and not vulnerable. Two specific actions showed a statisti-
cally significant trend: Cement Flooring and Schools. As shown in this table, 
there was a gradually increasing positive effect on this indicator as the level of  
investment per capita in the actions increased.
For the case of  the PS, the results suggest that the impacts of  the program 
were largest for those municipalities that had PS close to unity. Meaning that 
there was a progressively increasing effect of  the program as the poorest mu-
nicipalities were included.
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Table 11
Matched юѡѡ diﬀerences 
for not poor neither vulnerable population
Actions Levels 2010 Actions Levels 2010
Propensity Score 0.512*** Cement Flooring 0.00014*
(0.143) (8.3e-05)
Observations 73 Observations 70
R-squared 0.154 R-squared 0.058
Schools 0.0002**
(0.0001)
Observations 73
R-squared 0.097
Note: The ќљѠ regressions were run with robust standard errors and standard errors being 
the larger errors the ones who are reported in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Source: Own elaboration.
Table 12 shows the results for the outcome variable population with at least 
three social deprivation indicators. The coefficients for the Cement Flooring 
and Others in Education actions were statistically significant and negative, which 
means that the reduction on these outcome variables increased along with in-
vestment per capita in these actions. 
Table 12
Matched юѡѡ diﬀerences for population
with at least three social deprivation
Actions Levels 2010 Actions Levels 2010
Others in Education –0.0271** Cement Flooring –0.00447*
(0.0113) (0.00227)
Observations 73 Observations 70
R-squared 0.079 R-squared 0.062
Note: The ќљѠ regressions were run with robust standard errors and standard errors being the 
larger errors the ones who are reported in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Source: Own elaboration.
Lastly, in Tables 13 and 14 we see the results for the percentage of  population 
with income below the minimum welfare line indicator and extreme poverty. In 
Table 13, the investment in three specific actions showed a statistically signifi-
cant trend: Support Programs for Economic Activities14, Literacy, and Shelters. 
14  Which include specific actions such as Support for farmers and artisans, and mothers assisted by the 
daily childcare center.
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In Table 14, the coefficients for the investment per capita in Energetic Sup-
port, Food Assistance15 and Temporal Employment were statistically signifi- 
cant and negative. Indicating again that the municipalities that received the 
largest amounts of  investment on these actions were the ones who exhibited 
greater reductions of  this indicator. 
Table 13
Matched юѡѡ diﬀerences for population 
with income below the minimum welfare line
Actions Levels 2010 Actions Levels 2010
Shelters –0.00138* Support Programs –0.00181*
(0.000771) (0.000927)
Observations 69 Observations 73
R-squared 0.031 R-squared 0.042
Literacy –0.0112**
(0.00464)
Observations 73
R-squared 0.092
Note: The ќљѠ regressions were run with robust standard errors and standard errors being 
the larger errors the ones who are reported in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Source: Own elaboration.
Table 14
Matched юѡѡ diﬀerences for extreme poverty
Actions Levels 2010 Actions Levels 2010
Temporal Employment –0.0125* Energetic Support –0.0111*
(0.00664) (0.00662)
Observations 60 Observations 73
R-squared 0.037 R-squared 0.031
Food Assistance –0.0022*
(0.00123)
Observations 73
R-squared 0.033
Note: The ќљѠ regressions were run with robust standard errors and standard Errors being the 
larger errors the ones who are reported in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Source: Own elaboration.
15  Provision of  food supplements; Fortified milk delivered to households and families with grocery 
support.
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CќћѐљѢѠіќћѠ 
In the pursuit of  effectiveness of  development policies, the crucial need to coor-
dinate different levels of  governments and institutions is not a new topic and 
its importance is continuously advocated (see Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest, 
2010; Peters, 2015). 
Since the seventies Mexico has ventured in the design of  policy strategies 
oriented at solving the shortcomings left by poor management of  interdepen-
dencies in development policies. Indeed, the efficiency costs of  the lack of  
coordination and collaboration between players at different levels of  govern-
ment, ministries and program administrators has long been recognized. 
Every new administration endorses the need to develop a comprehensive 
plan to determine and respond to the needs for coordinating processes and 
procedures among adjacent institutions and between levels of  government. 
However, managing this kind of  interrelations has proven an elusive undertak-
ing. Admittedly, this is not an easy task. It is a complex web of  interdependen-
cies, simultaneously vertical, across different levels of  government, and hori-
zontal, among ministries and programs at the same level of  government, and 
networked (Koliba, Meek, and Zia, 2010). Surprisingly, there is only a handful 
of  studies in Mexico that investigate the tools being used to help bridge the 
gaps that exist between levels of  government as they design and implement 
public policies (see Collins et al., 2004; Ordaz Ocampo, 2012; Camacho García 
and Flamand, 2008; Cejudo Ramírez, 2012; Kroeger and Luna, 1992; Yaschine, 
Ochoa, and Hernández, 2014).
From our part, at the results level, the evidence presented in this paper sug-
gests a positive impact of  E100s100 whenever managed to get accompanied 
by a minimum of  investment. Hence, it’s possible to give an affirmative answer 
to the hypothesis that whenever E100s100’s intervention included the needed 
investment per action to the treated municipalities, the expected effects were 
found. This shows that even though, in the intention-to-treat evaluation carried 
out by Coneval, it was not possible to find many statistical significant differ-
ences, this did not imply that the intervention was not effective. It simply means 
that the E100s100 couldn’t intervene equally across municipalities. Furthermore, 
the evidence presented suggests the expected results were observed for those 
outcome variables whose associated actions successfully secure a minimum of  
investment.
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These findings bring new elements of  analysis for the intention-to-treat 
evaluation done by Coneval indicating that it was less likely that their evalua-
tion did not find the expected effects because the control municipalities ended 
up being treated. On the contrary, it has been shown that it is more likely that 
the municipalities in the treatment group actually received different treatments, 
some more effective than others. In other words, it has been suggested that 
E100s100’s intervention seems to have worked best whenever it managed to 
get accompanied by a certain level of  investment. However, in more cases than 
not, the E100s100 umbrella program couldn’t go that last mile. 
For the actions on which the intervention did not secure a minimum in-
vestment, the results were not the expected ones. Again, the important thing 
to notice is that the evidence provided suggests that the intention-to-treat 
evaluation did not find many statistical differences because the municipalities 
in the treatment group actually ended up not being treated differently than the 
control group in the sense that the intervention did not always include finan-
cial resources. Moreover, the evidence presented here poses severe doubts on 
the hypotheses advanced in the previous evaluation that no significant results 
were found due to the possibility that some of  the municipalities in the control 
group were also intervened. 
What is behind these differences in the treatment received by the municipa-
lities is hard to know without field data. However, it has long been recognized 
that the interinstitutional coordination is a complex matter and that policy 
designers face several hurdles to establish common goals and have an efficient 
communication among the actors involved. Moreover, the task of  setting strate-
gic priorities is inherently political and this could also pose several limits to the 
effectiveness of  coordinated strategies (Evans, 1995). It has also been known 
for a long time now that a key element in the efforts to develop an efficient and 
sustainable coordination of  public service delivery is the existence of  a series 
of  formalised measures, mechanisms and steps that ensure the commitment in 
the activities that need to be carried out by the actors involved in coordination 
process (Grindle, 2010; North and Shariq, 2004; Ordaz Ocampo, 2012). An 
element missing in the original design of  E100s100. 
Hardly anyone would contest the importance of  competent and commit-
ted individuals with strong values, good judgment and sound knowledge and 
understanding of  the mutual dependence of  policy responsibilities behind it 
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all. However, without the management basis for the entire interinstitutional 
coordination plan, a document that establishes committees and policies plac-
ing responsibility and authority where they are needed to accomplish tasks, 
there is little hope even for otherwise well-intentioned officials to overcome 
the natural resistance of  competition and turf  protection (Yaschine, Ochoa, 
and Hernández, 2014).
Thus, the Mexican government needs to start taking actions in order to de-
velop and implement the formal mechanisms that represent a challenge for the 
interinstitutional coordination. The mechanisms should focus on the clear rec-
ognition of  the existing government conditions and capacities to set and imple-
ment feasible priorities in a strategic manner. There is a need for clarity in roles, 
responsibilities and objectives. The need to focus on the specific requirements 
of  the communities in which services are delivered is apparent. The search for 
diverse methods to ensure accountability and the creation of  regulatory frame-
works or agreements for collaboration to take place are a must. A strong national 
leadership and management is required to strengthen both local government 
and civil society. The encouragement of  participation between communities and 
institutions to provide local solutions to local issues, along with regular meetings 
and effective communication among the representatives from many different 
ministries and agencies across government and the investment of  time and 
resources into community consultations and consensus building are needed 
(Keast, 2011; Stewart, Lohoar, and Higgins, 2011; Grindle, 2010; Gray, 2002; 
Leigh, 2008; Grindle, 2004; Ordaz Ocampo, 2012; Sabatier, 1986).
As long as the Mexican government continues assigning economic resources 
to programs like the E100s100 without creating the necessary conditions men-
tioned above, any further attempts such as the recent Cruzada Nacional Contra el 
Hambre [National Crusade Against Hunger] launched by the current administra-
tion will continue most likely to not show the desired results. Nowadays, Coneval 
has commissioned a specific assessment of  the interinstitutional coordination 
processes and procedures behind Cruzada Nacional Contra el Hambre, a program 
that certainly left things to be desired from the start (Yaschine, Ochoa, and 
Hernández, 2014). The results of  which, expected by 2016, will likely point in 
the same direction. 
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